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Tort Law-Interspousal Immunity-AcTiON FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
AGAINST SURVIVING SPOUSE HELD MAINTAINABLE WHEN SUCH ACT TER-
MINATES MARRIAGE AND NEITHER CHILD NOR GRANDCHILD SURVIVES DECEDENT
-Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975).
The doctrine of interspousal immunity, established at early common
law,' considers husband and wife legally one. Under this view of unity,
each spouse is precluded procedurally as well as substantively from suing
the other in tort.2 To ameliorate the harshness of this view, the Married
Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts were promulgated beginning in 1844.3
Although these statutes removed some of the disabilities of coverture from
women in all of the fifty states,4 the majority of the statutes, including
Virginia's,5 did not grant one spouse the right to sue the other for a personal
tort.6 As early as 1888, the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted the Virginia
1. Phillips v. Barnet, [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 436; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
2. Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Prindle, 82 Va. 122 (1886); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 859-60 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43
HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy]. The common law view resulted
as a matter of procedure since the husband would be both plaintiff and defendant. Sanford,
Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Sanford].
Also, the woman had no substantive right of action. Id.
3. The statutes are collected in 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 167, 179, 180
(1935).
4. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 651-60 (1955).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
6. In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), the Supreme Court in its only decision
addressing the rights of married women to maintain an action against their husbands for
personal torts construed the Code of the District of Columbia not to permit such actions. The
Court stated: "[S]uch radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought by language
so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention." Id. at 618.
Accord, Jones v. Pledger, 238 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1965); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197
Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955) (dictum); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952);
Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918); Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245,
114 S.E.2d 406 (1960). This view is based on a variety of premises. See Sanford, supra note
2, at 826-27.
In addition to those courts adhering to the common law doctrine of unity of spousal ident-
ity, other courts have determined as a matter of public policy not to allow interspousal
personal tort actions. See Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the
Family Exclusion Clause, 60 IOWA L. REv. 239 (1974); McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1052-53;
Sanford, supra note 2, at 828; Comment, Intrafamily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its Pres-
ent Status, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 27, 68 (1967); Note, Interspousal Immunity-A Policy Ori-
ented Approach, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 491; 493 (1967). This social policy is founded on a
number of factors. Some courts wish to maintain marital harmony and peace in the home.
See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). Contra, Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231,
330 A.2d 335 (1974). Others focus on preventing fraud or collusion between spouses against
insurance companies. See Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935); Harvey v.
Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572
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Married Women's Act as being supportive of personal tort immunity be-
tween husband and wife.7 Subsequent cases upheld this interpretation as
not expressly, nor by implication, giving the wife the right to sue her
husband for personal torts.'
Recently, the Virginia Supreme Court was given the opportunity to reev-
aluate its position in Korman v. Carpenter.' The case involved an action
for wrongful death brought by the administrator of Katherine Houghton's
estate against her husband's committee. The alleged cause of action arose
from the fatal shooting of Mrs. Houghton by Mr. Houghton. The trial court
sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that no action could be
maintained under Virginia's Wrongful Death Act"0 as the decedent would
not have been able to maintain a personal injury action against her assail-
ant had she lived." The Virginia Supreme Court, disregarding the common
(1955). Contra, Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). Still others allow the spouse
to seek her remedy in criminal or divorce actions. See Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P.
219 (1909); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920). Contra, Johnson v. Johnson,
201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
Although the majority of jurisdictions still favor interspousal immunity, there is an increas-
ing number which have either refused to apply this doctrine in specific fact situations or
which have discarded it totally. See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965);
Sanford, supra note 2, at 826 & n.7; Comment, Intrafamily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its
Present Status, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 27, 37 & n.44, 68-69 & n.149 (1967); 38 Mo. L. REv. 333,
334-35 & nn.15 & 16 (1973); 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 379, 380 & n.7 (1972). This minority finds
support in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 623-24
(1910):
I cannot believe that [Congress] intended to permit the wife to sue the husband
separately, in tort, for the recovery, including damages for the detention, of her prop-
erty, and at the same time deny her the right to sue him, separately, for a tort commit-
ted against her person. Id. at 623.
7. In Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 367, 7 S.E. 335, 341 (1888), the court, interpreting
the Married Women's Act, stated:
Being obviously an enabling act, it should not be construed strictly, as in derogation
of the common law, nor technically, but fairly, so as to carry out the intention of the
legislature, which is to secure to the feme covert, as separate estate, free from the
debts, liabilities. . . and not in anywise to affect or change the personal relations of
husband and wife which enter into the status of marriage.
8. Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96
S.E. 315 (1918). The court noted in Furey that the Married Women's Act had been thrice
amended since Keister, and the legislature had not enacted any law permitting the wife to
sue the husband for a tort. The doctrine was mentioned in Hargrow v. Watson, 200 Va. 30,
104 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
9. 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
11. The trial court relied on Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918), where the
common law doctrine of interspousal immunity precluded an administrator from recovering
under the wrongful death act.
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law doctrine of spouses' legal unity as fiction,1 2 reversed the circuit court's
decision.
The court based its decision on the social policy of preservation of mar-
riage and family harmony. 3 Since one spouse willfully had taken the life
of the other, and there was no longer a family harmony to maintain, there
was no reason for sustaining the immunity. 4 The court's narrow holding
was that an action for wrongful death may be maintained by beneficiaries
against the surviving spouse when the wrongful act results in termination
of the marriage by death and the deceased spouse was survived by no living
child or grandchild." Justice Harman disagreed with the majority. In his
dissenting opinion, he reiterated sentiments expressed in an earlier case 6
by Justice Cochran indicating that the court was exercising power which
rightfully belonged to the legislature.
Korman, by following a format established in earlier cases, appears to
follow a logical progression in the Virginia Supreme Court's complete abro-
gation of interspousal tort immunity. In Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis,"7 the
doctrine of personal tort immunity between child and parent was adopted
by the supreme court. Five years later the court paid lip service to the
parental immunity doctrine yet allowed a girl to recover from injuries
received on a bus owned by her father." This flexibility in viewing intra-
familial immunity cases was extended in a later case where the court
struck down two policy arguments often used in support of parental and
interspousal immunity, i.e., the possibility of fraud and the disruption of
family harmony. 9
12. The court stated: "We are not concerned with the outmoded fiction that husband and
wife are of 'one flesh'." 216 Va. at 90, 216 S.E.2d at 197.
13. Id. Other social policies such as fraud, collusion, or other remedies being available were
discussed and dismissed as non-substantive in Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 182-83, 183
S.E.2d 190, 192 (1971).
14. The court reasoned that if a tort action against a spouse was permitted for wrongful
death based on the wanton operation of an automobile, the use of a gun instead of an
automobile was not a valid reason for denying beneficiaries redress. 216 Va. at 91, 216 S.E.2d
at 198.
15. Id. at 91-92, 216 S.E.2d at 198.
16. Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
17. 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934). The court noted two exceptions to the parental
immunity doctrine: where the child was emancipated and where a master-servant relation-
ship existed between the two.
18. In Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 23, 4 S.E.2d 343, 348 (1939), the court considered
family harmony and stated: "This disability [parental immunity from suit] is not absolute.
It is imposed for the protection of family control and harmony, and exists only where a suit
• . . might disturb the family relations." quoting Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905,
915 (1930) (emphasis added).
19. In Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 832, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1960), involving a tort
[Vol. 10:434
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The Virginia Supreme Court further recanted its adherence to the doc-
trine of intrafamilial immunity in two decisions in 1971. In Smith v.
Kauffman, 0 the court held a -minor child could sue a parent for personal
injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the parent's negli-
gence. On the same day, under a wrongful death action, a wife's beneficiar-
ies were allowed to recover from the husband in Surratt v. Thompson.' In
these cases prior decisions affirming intrafamilial immunity served as the
rationale for abrogating the doctrine in specific factual situations. This
pattern was repeated in Korman, i.e., an intrafamilial immunity was abro-
gated with the holding limited to the "narrow question presented by the
facts." 12
Notwithstanding the emotionally desirable result reached by the court
in Korman, its analyses of both law and fact are subject to criticism. The
questionable analysis of law occurred in the court's treatment of Virginia's
wrongful death statute. There are basically two types of wrongful death
statutes: survival and death.? A survival statute creates a right in the
decedent's personal representative, allowing the personal representative to
sue the tortfeasor for injury sustained by the decedent prior to his death.
The right to recover is thought to be a continuance of that which the
decedent could have asserted if he had lived; therefore, the cause of action
is said to survive the decedent. The second type, a death statute, creates
a new right of action in the beneficiaries. It is brought to compensate the
survivors for loss occasioned by the death, and recovery is not predicated
on the decedent's personal injuries.
action between unemancipated brothers, the court upheld the action stating that the predic-
tion of a disruption of family harmony is "no more than a speculative assumption." In
addressing the possibility of fraud, the court said: "Fraud is never presumed .... Courts
should not immunize tort-feasors because of the possibility of fraud or collusion .... If
actions were barred because of the possibility of fraud many wrongs would be permitted to
go without redress." Id. at 833, 113 S.E.2d at 878. The court also cast doubt on the common
law policy by noting 15 C.J.S. Common Law § 2, at 613. Id. at 832, 113 S.E.2d at 877. See 22
CATH. U.L. REv. 167 (1972).
20. 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). Here the court addressed and struck down several
policy arguments in favor of intrafamilial immunity: possibility of collusion or fraud and
promotion of peace in the home.
21. 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). The court held that a wife may maintain an action
against her husband for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident; therefore, the
decedent wife's beneficiaries may recover under a wrongful death action. Here the court
addressed and struck down the common law barrier to interspousal suits citing two New
Jersey cases: State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957), and Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J.
482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), which advocated a change in the common law to meet changing
times.
22. 216 Va. at 92, 216 S.E.2d at 198.
23. 22 AM. JuR. 2d Death § 13 (1965).
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In Korman, the court did not examine Virginia's Wrongful Death Act 2
in order to determine in which classification it belonged. If the legislative
history and subsequent case law interpreting the statute had been exam-
ined, the court would have found it to be a death statutes with a new right
of action in the beneficiaries being derived from the tortious act rather
than from the person of the deceased. Thus, the beneficiaries should not
have had to address the interspousal immunity issue ab initio. Clearly the
rights of the beneficiaries are independent of the decedents and thus un-
touched by the doctrine. Numerous cases have dealt with and rejected the
idea that personal immunity can block the right of recovery in a wrongful
death action.26 The court's analysis of the factual situation is also suspect.
The court, in basing its decision on the maintenance of family harmony,
is clinging to an illusion. When one spouse murders the other, any sembl-
ance of unity is shattered whether or not children survive the decedent. If
there are no living children, there is no family unit to maintain. If children
do survive the decedent, the convicted spouse will probably be incarcer-
ated for his crime thereby destroying the family unit.
2 1
Although legal scholars view the abrogation of interspousal immunity as
eminently desirable,2 it is submitted that Virginia will not totally reject
the doctrine. Whenever family peace or harmony is endangered, the Su-
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
25. In 1871, the General Assembly of Virginia passed a wrongful death act modeled after
Lord Campbell's Act. Va. Acts of Assembly 1871, ch. 29, at 27. Lord Campbell's Act was
enacted by English Parliament in 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). It provided:
1. That an action may be maintained whenever death is caused by a wrongful act,
neglect, or default which would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action
if death had not ensued.
2. That such action is for the benefit of certain designated members of a deceased's
family or close of kin.
3. That damages recoverable in such action are those suffered by such beneficiaries
by reason of the death. 25A C.J.S. Death § 15, at 592 (1966) (emphasis added).
For the legislative history of the Virginia Wrongful Death Act see Hudson Motor Car. Co. v.
Hertz, 121 F.2d 326, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1941). See also Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.
1958); Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Keesee, 111 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wilson v.
Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E.2d 124 (1967); Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687,
24 S.E. 269 (1896).
26. In Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss. 335, 54 So.2d 476 (1951), the
court stated that even though the wife was under personal disability to sue, the suit was a
new cause of action derived from the tortious act and not from the decedent. See, e.g., Welch
v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952).
27. See Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465,
BPOE, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
28. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 643-46 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 864 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, supra note 2; 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 379, 384 &
n.29 (1972).
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preme Court of Virginia sees its duty as protector of "the most sacred
relation known to society."29 As long as this policy is followed Virginia will
continue to reject interspousal immunity only in specific factual situa-
tions. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harman may have focused upon a
resolution to the interspousal immunity issue by suggesting the decision
be left to the legislature. However, since there was no legislative action
following the intrafamilial immunity cases in 1971, the outlook for legisla-
tive abrogation of interspousal immunity in 1976 remains dim.
L.H.S.
29. Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 733, 71 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1952).
